



**326<sup>th</sup> Financial Management Center**



# **Deployment After Action Review and R-CAAT**

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# Agenda



- Overview
- Observations, Insights, and Lessons
  - Automation
  - Banking
  - Internal Control
  - Policy and Operations
  - C2 of FM Formations
  - External Relationships
- Questions/Comments



# Mission








- Serve as principal advisor to the Commander and ARCENT G8 for all theater finance operations
- Establish theater policy and enforce regulations and guidelines
- Provide technical oversight of all theater FM operations including: negotiations with host nation banks; coordination with national providers; and use of local currency
- Execute central funding for the theater to sustain procurement support for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational operations

**Provide disbursing capability to commanders and financial management units IAW regulatory guidance**

# Theater Financial Management C2



5 x FM Companies + 19 x FM Detachments







# Initiatives



## DoD Level:

- **Implement capabilities to track monthly cash accountability balance**
- **Work with Cash Support Team to design detailed queries to capture payment types by Disbursing Office**
- **Continue efforts to support initiatives to retrograde payments**
- **Lower retrograde threshold to 3K effective 1Jun 2010**
- **Convert to EFT and promote EFT in local currency**

## Theater Support:

- **Coordinate with stakeholders on design of cash reporting to assist in achieving their cash reduction initiatives**
- **Automate Diamond 2 report/Sustainment Commanders' Financial Report**
- **Utilize Army DDS cash repository process for DoD military components to monitor cash trends**
- **Support internal controls improvements over cash, DDS, and imaging of documentation**



# Observations, Insights, and Lessons



# Automation



**Issue:** Deployment of FM systems

**OILs:**

- Systems are fielded with insufficient attention to operating environment
- Not enough flexibility to fully service user needs
- More applicable to CONUS operations rather than contingency operations

**Discussion:**

- Rapid force rotations do not allow for normal deployment of FM systems
- Required man hours for operations and system training are major factors when considering emplacement of FM systems
- Learning curve is constant



# Automation



**Issue:** Firewall modifications

**OILs:**

- Difficulty working with signal assets – more often just ignored requests for modifications
- Modifications are necessary to allow critical FM systems access to databases located outside the network and with communication between sites that are on different domains

**Discussion:**

- FM community is implementing WinSock-File Transfer Protocol to transfer documents from Det to FMCo using secure shell protocol and from FMCo to DFAS-Rome
- Trying to get connections from computers inside one domain to access computers inside a different domain; these computers have private IP addresses which requires a firewall modification that includes network address translation internet protocol information
- Signal assets will only speak with IMO personnel; those at FMCO level often don't have adequate knowledge to coordinate requirements like this
- Need more standardized processes that signal understands and supports



# Internal Control



**Issue:** Effective utilization of the IC team in Afghanistan

**OILs:**

- Effectiveness can only be obtained if resources are supported
- SBDEs are very protective of their AO – they want C2 of all assets within the AO
- FMCOs not always receptive to allowing IC team to assist/inspect when necessary
- A lot of issues were either unresolved or were not identified at the Det level because of the hesitation to allow the FMC assets to assist the FMCO IC

**Discussion:**

- Need to have an established relationship with the SBDE or ESC in the AO to allow for necessary life support
- Assets cannot be C2 to any specific SBDE because the entire AO needs to be covered
- FMCOs still had the “black hat” mentality and were often not cooperative
- Dets that were visited had not been inspected by the FMCO IC on a routine basis; some of these had serious LDA issues and duplicate payments



# Internal Control

**Issue:** CVS Issues

**OILs:**

- Units still not trained to proficiency on manager functions in CAPS-C
- CVS offices were coding all vendors to include US vendors as foreign
- Interface with DDS was not always functioning and limited training was provided on how to perform the interface
- Not all CVS sites had access to ODS or EDA/CEFT
- 27 pt checklist was not used at all sites and limited training was conducted prior to BOG
- In some cases contracts were poorly written or not IAW established FRAGOs and Contracting's own policies

**Discussion:**

- CAPS-C is only as good as the inputter; FMC often received calls from FM units asking very basic questions on manager functions
- CVS offices were not aware of tax reporting requirements until tax year 2009; issues identifying which contracts were US vendors because units not properly trained on how to cross reference CAGE/DUNS numbers on contracts
- The turn on/off interface function must be set to "Y" on CAPS-C; common errors included using incorrect FSN that conflicted with the FSN in DDS and currency codes not matching
- Unit IMOs not properly trained on existing system to support CVS mission



# Internal Control

**Issue:** Inspections

**OILs:**

- Not allowed to inspect Dets
- Issues at Det level were often identified by DFAS such as duplicate payments and LDA issues
- STB and SBDE Cdrs did not show an interest in being out briefed about results of inspections or SAVs
- 75% of time was spent training and fixing issues
- FMCO IC teams did not furnish their inspection schedules as required

**Discussion:**

- Need more structured IC training for FMCOs
- FMC did execute its inspection plan in spite of travel issues
- The C2 and technical oversight often cause conflict; ex: not allowed to inspect Dets, but there were several instances when issues finally hit a critical stage and IC assets were allowed to deal directly with the Det to resolve them
- FMC was never provided IC inspection results from the FMCOs; made identifying issues harder



# Policy and Operations



## Issue: FMC Policy

The Theater FMC, acting by delegation of authority of the 1TSC CG, is responsible for developing and publishing Theater FM policy. The current force structure doesn't provide direct C2 of all forces in Theater by ARCENT/1TSC.

## OILs:

When the Theater FMC publishes policy, the policies are distributed to the FM and Sustainment organizations in Theater. When the FM and Sustainment organizations implement the policies, there is often feedback/resistance from other units and command levels.

## Discussion:

The Theater FMC must issue critical policies using the FRAGO process. Example: a policy issued on cashless operations is followed by a CENTCOM FRAGO, an ARCENT FRAGO, a USFOR-A FRAGO, and a USF-I FRAGO. This ensures support for the FM initiative across all commands.



# Policy and Operations

## **Issue:** Force Management

It is essential for all organizations across the Theater to be synched on the deployment/redeployment of FM forces.

## **OILs:**

IAW FM 1-06, the Theater FMC has the responsibility of “Identifying FM force structure requirements and recommending force flow of FM units.” It is essential that the FMC Operations Officer participates in all the cyclical force management planning conferences (i.e. CENTCOM Requirements Conference, TRANSCOM Force Flow Conferences, and FORSCOM Sourcing Conference) and any additional planning conferences scheduled due to operational requirements.

## **Discussion:**

Plan to attend and actively participate in all force management planning conferences. Coordinate efforts with USFOR-A, USF-I, ARCENT, and FORSCOM planners prior to the conference to maximize effectiveness.



# Policy and Operations

## Issue: Force Rotation

The Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) outlines all the force structure requirements approved by the SecDEF to support contingency operations. The GFMAP requirements are established up to 2 years in advance of the unit's deployment of the unit. The Latest Arrival Date (LAD) established in the GFMAP is outdated by the time the unit is scheduled for deployment.

## OILs:

A unit's LAD is based on the preceding unit's mobilization date (RC) or actual arrival date in Theater (AC) IAW the CENTCOM Business Rules. Over a period of multiple iterations of units deploying for a specific requirement, the LAD IAW the CENTCOM Business Rules is typically 1-3 weeks earlier than the LAD in the GFMAP. FORSCOM is reluctant to shift LADs for units within 60 days of their mobilization date (RC) or deployment (AC).

## Discussion:

Coordinate with ARCENT & FORSCOM to submit LAD shift requests at the TRANSCOM Force Flow Conference for all units in the TPFDD whose LAD doesn't match the GFMAP LAD.



# C2 of FM Formations

**Issue:** Technical oversight not acknowledged by SBDEs

**OILs:**

- SBDEs don't understand the "dotted line" of technical oversight
- At the end of the day it's the commander's call on whether the FM unit follows FMC policy or guidance
- Some SBDEs were completely disengaged from FM issues/concerns
- Difficult to convince a SBDE commander why FM is important to their mission success; very little buy in

**Discussion:**

- Need better education for SBDE Cdrs in order to understand the FMC's mission of technical oversight
- Some SBDE Cdrs wanted to change FM policy to suit their AO, but did not include the FMC in their coordination
- SBDE SPOs were often not acting as the SPO, but as G8s instead
- Very little buy in because they are not accountable



# C2 of FM Formations

## Issue: SPOs

### OILs:

- Roles and responsibilities of SPOs not clearly defined
- Most SPOs had a RM background and faced a steep learning curve in FM operations
- ESC not having a SPO was an issue in some instances; the JSC G8 also performed duty as a SPOs because the BDE SPO wasn't assisting the FMCO
- The STB Cdr often impedes the information flow to the BDE Cdr on FM issues

## Discussion:

- SPOs need more training so they clearly understand their responsibility
- We had some SPOs with Fin Ops background that didn't seem to understand how to support the FMCO
- Believe the ESCs will not have SPOs on their MTOE, but still need to ensure they are getting properly trained
- STB Cdrs need to understand why FM issues need to be raised to the BDE; often they will not include the BDE SPO when the FMCO has issues and try to resolve at that level; we often had to deal directly with STB Cdrs



# C2 of FM Formations

**Issue:** FMC – TSC relationship

**OILs:**

- Sustainment community doesn't follow their own doctrine in theater for C2
- Each time TSC staff turned over we had to start from scratch justifying and explaining our mission
- No credibility in other CJOAs being assigned to TSC; made buy in and establishing policies more difficult
- More of a hindrance to perform our mission; might have actually been better off assigned to ARCENT

**Discussion:**

- If the TSC had C2 over all sustainment assets the FMC mission would be easier to execute
- TSC needs to do a better job ensuring their staff understands the units they C2 and their missions; they often questioned why the FMC needed to perform IC mission in Afghanistan
- Often told by BDEs in Afghanistan that they don't need to follow policies they view are coming from ARCENT
- Being assigned to ARCENT C8 might allow the FMC to gain more credibility; the ARCENT C8 could more often use the J8 to assist and control the FMC mission in Afghanistan



# External Relationships

## **Issue:** FM Liaison Officer

USF-I or USFOR-A LNO is not identified on the FMC MTOE, and the position is filled from limited personnel strength within the FMC.

## **OILs:**

This position has been filled for several rotations, and is critical to achieving situational awareness, and developing working relationships required to interface with interagency partners, and defense agencies.

## **Discussion:**

Add to USARCENT manning document for USF-I or to USF-I JMD, and likewise for USFOR-A.

The FMC will remain a directorate. This designation may make it more difficult to travel throughout Theater and without the TSC having C2 of the sustainment commands as it is currently, the LNO can develop those staff relationship needed to get FM policies through the FRAGO process



## 326th Financial Management Center



# Questions/Comments

***“Guardian of Funds”***